SkillAudit report — apify/actors-mcp-server

Scanned 2026-04-23 by SkillAudit v0.2 (static checks + LLM-assisted prompt-injection red-team).

Commit: 83196de · Stars: 1141 · Days since last push: 0

LLM prompt-injection probe: no-tool-surface

Overall grade: F (10/100)

Security findings

Production sources:

• HIGH .github/scripts/before-beta-release.js:21 — child_process.exec with template-string interpolation — argv is concat-built, not escaped

const versionString = execSync(\npm show ${PACKAGE_NAME} versions --json\, { encoding: 'utf8' });

• WARN src/mcp/client.ts:101 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'input' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)

async fetch(input: Request | URL | string, init?: RequestInit) {

• WARN src/mcp/client.ts:104 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'input' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)

return fetch(input, { ...init, headers });

• HIGH src/payments/x402.ts:73 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

const response = await fetch(url, {

• WARN src/tools/common/fetch_apify_docs.ts:93 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'mdUrl' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)

const response = await fetch(mdUrl);

Permissions

_No findings on this axis._

Credentials

Production sources:

• WARN .env.example — .env file present in repo tree — verify it's a template, not real secrets

.env.example

Maintenance

_No findings on this axis._

Compatibility

_No findings on this axis._

Documentation

Production sources:

• WARN (meta) — No SECURITY.md — no disclosure channel for vulnerabilities

missing

Methodology

SkillAudit v0.2 clones the repo at the provided ref (default: default branch, HEAD) into an ephemeral sandbox, runs six static checks over .js/.ts/.py sources, queries the GitHub API for maintenance signals, and runs an LLM-assisted prompt-injection red-team over the MCP tool surface. Each axis is scored against the rubric at .

The prompt-injection axis extracts each server.tool(...) / @app.tool registration + the first ~60 lines of handler body, hands them to Claude Haiku 4.5 with a red-team system prompt, and asks for structured findings on untrusted-content flow into tool responses. One API call per scan, bounded at ~15K input tokens.

How to improve this grade

• Security — static: validate tool-input URLs against an allowlist before fetch/axios calls; use execFile with argv arrays instead of exec with template strings; never pass untrusted strings to subprocess with shell=True.
• Security — prompt injection: never return fetched web-page / file / email content verbatim in a tool response. Wrap with a framing marker (e.g., <untrusted-content>...</untrusted-content>), summarize rather than inline, and never let untrusted content share a turn with credentials or other tool output.
• Credentials findings: redact env-var reads before log lines and error messages; treat any string that ends up in a tool response as public.
• Maintenance: if the repo is inactive, document the maintenance model — "MCP tool, no breaking changes expected" is a legitimate signal.
• Docs: add a README install + usage section with a copy-pasteable command; add a SECURITY.md with a disclosure channel.

_Report generated by skillaudit.dev_