SkillAudit report — modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk
Scanned 2026-04-23 by SkillAudit v0.2 (static checks + LLM-assisted prompt-injection red-team).
Commit: 7d7e62c · Stars: 12265 · Days since last push: 0
LLM prompt-injection probe: skipped — set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY to enable the LLM-assisted prompt-injection red-team
Overall grade: F (15/100)
| Axis | Score | Grade | |
|---|---|---|---|
| security | 15/100 | F | ❌ |
| permissions | 100/100 | A | ✅ |
| credentials | 100/100 | A | ✅ |
| maintenance | 90/100 | A | ✅ |
| compatibility | 100/100 | A | ✅ |
| docs | 100/100 | A | ✅ |
Security findings
Production sources:
- WARN
examples/server/src/serverGuide.examples.ts:108— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)
const res = await fetch(url);
- WARN
examples/server/src/serverGuide.examples.ts:273— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)
const res = await fetch(url);
- HIGH
examples/server-quickstart/src/index.ts:24— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file
const response = await fetch(url, { headers });
- HIGH
packages/server/src/server/mcp.examples.ts:138— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file
const res = await fetch(url);
- HIGH
scripts/fetch-spec-types.ts:17— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file
const response = await fetch(url);
- HIGH
scripts/fetch-spec-types.ts:33— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file
const response = await fetch(url);
Test-site findings (lower weight): 67 total in test/ paths — first 3 shown
- WARN
packages/client/test/client/sse.test.ts:257— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)
return fetch(url.toString(), { ...init, headers });
- WARN
packages/client/test/client/sse.test.ts:278— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)
return fetch(url.toString(), { ...init, headers });
- WARN
packages/middleware/node/test/streamableHttp.test.ts:127— HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'baseUrl' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)
return fetch(baseUrl, {
Permissions
_No findings on this axis._
Credentials
_No findings on this axis._
Maintenance
Production sources:
- WARN
(meta)— 295 open issues — triage backlog
295 open
Compatibility
_No findings on this axis._
Documentation
_No findings on this axis._
Methodology
SkillAudit v0.2 clones the repo at the provided ref (default: default branch, HEAD) into an ephemeral sandbox, runs six static checks over .js/.ts/.py sources, queries the GitHub API for maintenance signals, and runs an LLM-assisted prompt-injection red-team over the MCP tool surface. Each axis is scored against the rubric at
The prompt-injection axis extracts each server.tool(...) / @app.tool registration + the first ~60 lines of handler body, hands them to Claude Haiku 4.5 with a red-team system prompt, and asks for structured findings on untrusted-content flow into tool responses. One API call per scan, bounded at ~15K input tokens.
How to improve this grade
- Security — static: validate tool-input URLs against an allowlist before fetch/axios calls; use
execFilewith argv arrays instead ofexecwith template strings; never pass untrusted strings tosubprocesswithshell=True. - Security — prompt injection: never return fetched web-page / file / email content verbatim in a tool response. Wrap with a framing marker (e.g.,
<untrusted-content>...</untrusted-content>), summarize rather than inline, and never let untrusted content share a turn with credentials or other tool output. - Credentials findings: redact env-var reads before log lines and error messages; treat any string that ends up in a tool response as public.
- Maintenance: if the repo is inactive, document the maintenance model — "MCP tool, no breaking changes expected" is a legitimate signal.
- Docs: add a README install + usage section with a copy-pasteable command; add a SECURITY.md with a disclosure channel.
_Report generated by skillaudit.dev_
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