SkillAudit report — neo4j-contrib/mcp-neo4j

Scanned 2026-04-24 by SkillAudit v0.2 (static checks + LLM-assisted prompt-injection red-team).

Commit: dbc01ba · Stars: 940 · Days since last push: 14

LLM prompt-injection probe: no-tool-surface

Overall grade: F (10/100)

Security findings

Production sources:

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:39 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'auth_url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.post(auth_url, headers=headers, data=payload)

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:95 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.get(url, headers=self._get_headers())

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:110 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.get(url, headers=self._get_headers())

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:117 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.get(url, headers=self._get_headers())

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:198 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.post(url, headers=self._get_headers(), json=payload)

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:229 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.post(url, headers=self._get_headers())

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:235 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.post(url, headers=self._get_headers())

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:241 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.get(url, headers=self._get_headers())

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:247 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.get(url, headers=self._get_headers())

• HIGH servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/src/mcp_neo4j_aura_manager/aura_api_client.py:260 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' — no URL allowlist / validation found in file

response = requests.delete(url, headers=self._get_headers())

Test-site findings (lower weight): 2 total in test/ paths — first 3 shown

• WARN servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/tests/integration/test_http_transport_IT.py:78 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'server_url' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)

response = requests.get(server_url.replace("/mcp/", "/health"), timeout=5)

• WARN servers/mcp-neo4j-cloud-aura-api/tests/integration/test_http_transport_IT.py:128 — HTTP client call with user-controlled argument 'url' (validation markers present but not verified against this call-site)

response = requests.get(url, timeout=5)

Permissions

_No findings on this axis._

Credentials

_No findings on this axis._

Maintenance

_No findings on this axis._

Compatibility

Production sources:

• WARN (meta) — No engines (Node) or python_requires declared — cross-client compatibility unverified

Documentation

Production sources:

• WARN README — README has no usage/example section

no usage section

Methodology

SkillAudit v0.2 clones the repo at the provided ref (default: default branch, HEAD) into an ephemeral sandbox, runs six static checks over .js/.ts/.py sources, queries the GitHub API for maintenance signals, and runs an LLM-assisted prompt-injection red-team over the MCP tool surface. Each axis is scored against the rubric at .

The prompt-injection axis extracts each server.tool(...) / @app.tool registration + the first ~60 lines of handler body, hands them to Claude Haiku 4.5 with a red-team system prompt, and asks for structured findings on untrusted-content flow into tool responses. One API call per scan, bounded at ~15K input tokens.

How to improve this grade

• Security — static: validate tool-input URLs against an allowlist before fetch/axios calls; use execFile with argv arrays instead of exec with template strings; never pass untrusted strings to subprocess with shell=True.
• Security — prompt injection: never return fetched web-page / file / email content verbatim in a tool response. Wrap with a framing marker (e.g., <untrusted-content>...</untrusted-content>), summarize rather than inline, and never let untrusted content share a turn with credentials or other tool output.
• Credentials findings: redact env-var reads before log lines and error messages; treat any string that ends up in a tool response as public.
• Maintenance: if the repo is inactive, document the maintenance model — "MCP tool, no breaking changes expected" is a legitimate signal.
• Docs: add a README install + usage section with a copy-pasteable command; add a SECURITY.md with a disclosure channel.

_Report generated by skillaudit.dev_