MCP server CSS content property consent security

CSS content property attack surface overview

Attack 1: content: attr(data-consent) — empty attribute replaces consent text rendering

The attr() function in the content property reads a named DOM attribute and uses its value as the rendered content. When applied to a non-pseudo element (supported in Chrome 120+), it replaces the element's entire rendered output with the attribute value. An attacker uses this by: (1) writing the CSS rule .mcp-consent { content: attr(data-consent); }, and (2) setting data-consent="" on the DOM node via JavaScript. The consent element renders as completely empty. el.textContent still returns the original consent text because the text node was never modified:

/* Malicious CSS — SA-CSS-CP-001 */
.mcp-consent-paragraph {
  content: attr(data-consent);
  /* data-consent attribute value is used as the rendered content.
     If data-consent="" → element renders as empty.
     If data-consent="By clicking Install you agree." →
       the entire original consent text is replaced by this short string.
  */
}

/* Malicious JS — sets the attribute to an empty string */
document.querySelector('.mcp-consent-paragraph').setAttribute('data-consent', '');

/* HTML — note: text node is present and intact */


/* DOM check results:
   el.textContent  → "This MCP server will access your files..." (full text)
   el.innerText    → "" (rendered text is empty — innerText reads rendered)
   getComputedStyle(el).content → 'attr(data-consent)' or '' depending on Chrome version

   Detection:
   1. Read el.innerText (reflects rendering) vs. el.textContent (reflects DOM text node)
   2. If innerText is empty but textContent is not → content substitution attack
   3. Also check getComputedStyle(el).content for 'attr(' prefix
*/

function detectContentAttrSubstitution(root = document) {
  const findings = [];
  const CONSENT = /consent|disclosure|terms|privacy|grant.*access|agree.*install/i;

  for (const el of root.querySelectorAll('*')) {
    const domText      = (el.textContent || '').trim();
    const renderedText = (el.innerText    || '').trim();
    const cs           = getComputedStyle(el);
    const contentVal   = cs.content || '';

    if (!CONSENT.test(domText.substring(0, 300))) continue;

    /* Check 1: content property contains attr() function */
    if (contentVal.includes('attr(')) {
      findings.push({ id: 'SA-CSS-CP-001', severity: 'high',
        message: `Consent element has CSS content: attr(). The rendered text may differ from DOM textContent — the attribute value may be empty or a decoy string. DOM textContent: "${domText.substring(0, 80)}..."; rendered innerText: "${renderedText.substring(0, 80)}..."` });
    }

    /* Check 2: rendered text is empty but DOM text is not (innerText divergence) */
    if (domText.length > 50 && renderedText.length < 5) {
      findings.push({ id: 'SA-CSS-CP-001', severity: 'high',
        message: `Consent element DOM textContent (${domText.length} chars) diverges from rendered innerText (${renderedText.length} chars). Content may have been replaced by CSS content property or attribute substitution.` });
    }
  }
  return findings;
}

Attack 2: content: none — removing rendered content entirely

In Chrome 120+, content: none applied to a non-pseudo-element removes all rendered content from that element. The element box may still take up space (depending on min-height and padding) but renders no text. Prior to Chrome 120, content on non-pseudo elements was silently ignored — this attack works only on Chromium 120+ (Chrome, Edge, Brave). SkillAudit must check the browser's version to determine if this attack is viable in the target environment:

/* Malicious CSS — SA-CSS-CP-002 */
.mcp-disclosure-block {
  content: none;
  /* Chrome 120+ only: removes all rendered content from the block element.
     min-height may keep the element taking up visual space (looks like an empty box).
     getComputedStyle(el).content → "none"
     el.textContent → original consent text (DOM unchanged)
     el.innerText   → "" (nothing rendered)
  */

  /* Maintain visual space so the dialog looks normal */
  min-height: 60px;
  padding: 8px 12px;
  background: #f9f9f9;
  border-radius: 4px;
  /* The element looks like a consent area — light background, appropriate height —
     but contains no rendered text. */
}

/* Detection */
function detectContentNone(root = document) {
  const findings = [];
  const CONSENT = /consent|disclosure|terms|privacy|grant.*access|agree.*install/i;

  for (const el of root.querySelectorAll('*')) {
    if (!CONSENT.test((el.textContent || '').substring(0, 300))) continue;
    const cs = getComputedStyle(el);
    if (cs.content === 'none' || cs.content === 'normal') {
      /* 'normal' resolves to 'none' for block elements in Chrome 120+ */
      const rendered = (el.innerText || '').trim();
      if (rendered.length < 5) {
        findings.push({ id: 'SA-CSS-CP-002', severity: 'high',
          message: `Consent element has CSS content: none (Chrome 120+ block element support). The element renders no text despite having DOM text content. The element may maintain visual size via min-height/padding to appear as an empty consent area.` });
      }
    }
  }
  return findings;
}

Attack 3: content: url() — replacing consent text with a transparent image

content: url(transparent.png) replaces the element's rendered content with an image. For non-pseudo elements in Chrome 120+, this replaces the text output with the referenced image. A 1×1 transparent PNG makes the element appear empty (or as a tiny invisible pixel). The image can be served from the skill's own server — a server-side redirect can later change the image to non-transparent, creating an on/off switch for the attack that can be toggled after installation is complete. The URL variant is also exploitable via data URLs:

/* Malicious CSS — SA-CSS-CP-003 */
.mcp-consent-text {
  content: url('https://cdn.mcp-server-example.com/spacer.png');
  /* OR: content: url('...'); */

  /* The image is a 1x1 transparent PNG — rendered as a tiny invisible dot.
     el.textContent still returns the full consent text.
     el.innerText returns "" (no text rendered).

     Remote URL variant: the server initially serves a transparent image.
     After user installs the MCP server, the server redirects to a visible image
     (e.g., a green checkmark), making it appear the consent was properly shown —
     but at install time, no consent text was visible.
  */
}

/* Detection: check content property for url() function */
function detectContentUrlReplacement(root = document) {
  const findings = [];
  const CONSENT = /consent|disclosure|terms|privacy|grant.*access|agree.*install/i;

  for (const el of root.querySelectorAll('*')) {
    if (!CONSENT.test((el.textContent || '').substring(0, 300))) continue;
    const cs = getComputedStyle(el);
    const contentVal = cs.content || '';

    if (contentVal.startsWith('url(') || contentVal.includes('url("') || contentVal.includes("url('")) {
      findings.push({ id: 'SA-CSS-CP-003', severity: 'high',
        message: `Consent element has CSS content: url(). The element's rendered content is replaced by an image. DOM textContent is unchanged but no text is rendered. The image may be transparent, making the consent area appear empty.` });
    }
  }
  return findings;
}

Attack 4: ::before pseudo-element overlay covering consent text in parent

The classic pseudo-element attack: .mcp-consent-wrapper::before with content: "", display: block, position: absolute, and dimensions matching the wrapper creates an invisible overlay element above the consent text. The pseudo-element is a child of the wrapper in the rendering tree but not in the DOM — el.querySelectorAll('*') does not find it. The overlay covers all text in the consent wrapper. This is distinguishable from SA-CSS-CP-001 through SA-CSS-CP-003 because the consent text DOM node is unmodified and innerText may still return some text (depending on z-index stacking), but the visual layer is occluded:

/* Malicious CSS — SA-CSS-CP-004 */
.mcp-consent-wrapper {
  position: relative; /* establishes positioning context for ::before */
}

.mcp-consent-wrapper::before {
  content: ""; /* creates the pseudo-element */
  display: block;
  position: absolute;
  top: 0;
  left: 0;
  width: 100%;
  height: 100%;
  background: white; /* matches page background — invisible overlay */
  z-index: 999; /* above consent text */
  /* Pseudo-element covers the entire consent wrapper with a white rectangle.
     The consent text exists in the DOM and in DOM layout, but is painted below
     the white pseudo-element overlay and is not visible to the user. */
}

/* Detection: check ::before and ::after computed styles on consent ancestors */
function detectPseudoElementOverlay(root = document) {
  const findings = [];
  const CONSENT = /consent|disclosure|terms|privacy|grant.*access|agree.*install/i;

  for (const el of root.querySelectorAll('*')) {
    if (!CONSENT.test((el.textContent || '').substring(0, 300))) continue;

    for (const pseudo of ['::before', '::after']) {
      const cs = getComputedStyle(el, pseudo);
      const contentVal = cs.content || 'none';
      if (contentVal === 'none' || contentVal === 'normal') continue;

      const pos    = cs.position;
      const width  = parseFloat(cs.width)  || 0;
      const height = parseFloat(cs.height) || 0;
      const zIndex = parseInt(cs.zIndex)   || 0;

      if (pos === 'absolute' && width > 50 && height > 20 && zIndex > 0) {
        const bgColor = cs.backgroundColor;
        findings.push({ id: 'SA-CSS-CP-004', severity: 'high',
          message: `Consent element has a ${pseudo} pseudo-element with position: absolute, z-index: ${zIndex}, dimensions ${width}×${height}px, background: ${bgColor}. The pseudo-element may cover the consent text with an opaque overlay.` });
      }
    }
  }
  return findings;
}

SkillAudit findings for CSS content property consent attacks

Related MCP consent attack research

• CSS background-clip text attacks — transparent color + background-image makes glyphs invisible
• CSS counter/generated content attacks — ::before content replaces visible consent text
• CSS quotes property attacks — quote character substitution and removal
• CSS isolation/stacking context attacks — z-index cover elements
• CSS filter effects as a consent bypass vector