MCP server SVG feMerge consent security — z-order stacking with feFlood as last feMergeNode, structural distinction from feBlend, multi-layer stacking, and compound filter detection resistance

Attack 1: feMerge with feFlood as last feMergeNode — z-order stacking covers consent text (SA-CSS-FMG-001)

A feMerge element containing two feMergeNode children: the first references SourceGraphic (the consent text) and the second references the output of a feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="1" primitive. The z-order rule says the last feMergeNode renders on top. The Porter-Duff “over” compositing formula for an opaque white top layer (top_alpha=1): out = white × 1 + consent_text × (1 − 1) = white × 1 + 0 = white. The entire consent panel is covered with white.

The structural difference between this attack and feBlend mode="normal" is important: feBlend is a primitive that takes in and in2 attributes and applies a blend function; feMerge is a primitive that takes an arbitrary number of feMergeNode children, each specifying one layer. A security audit that checks filterEl.querySelectorAll('feBlend[mode="normal"]') will find zero results in this filter graph — there is no feBlend element. The audit must also check feMerge elements and examine their feMergeNode children for suspicious inputs like feFlood results.

/* SA-CSS-FMG-001: feMerge with feFlood last feMergeNode
   Porter-Duff "over" z-order: last feMergeNode renders on top
   feFlood(white, opacity=1) as last node: out = white*1 + consent*(1-1) = white
   Entire consent panel covered

   Structural distinction from feBlend:
   - feBlend: takes in/in2 attributes, applies blend function formula
   - feMerge: takes feMergeNode children, stacks in z-order (over compositing)
   Audits checking querySelectorAll('feBlend') find nothing — different element type */

<svg width="0" height="0" style="position:absolute">
  <defs>
    <filter id="consent-feMerge-cover" x="0%" y="0%" width="100%" height="100%">
      <!-- feFlood generates opaque white layer for use as top feMergeNode -->
      <feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="1" result="white-cover"/>

      <!-- feMerge: SourceGraphic at bottom, white-cover on top
           Last feMergeNode = white-cover → renders over consent text completely -->
      <feMerge>
        <feMergeNode in="SourceGraphic"/>   <!-- consent text at bottom (z=0) -->
        <feMergeNode in="white-cover"/>      <!-- white feFlood on top (z=1) -->
      </feMerge>
    </filter>
  </defs>
</svg>

<div id="consent-fmg" style="filter:url(#consent-feMerge-cover);
     background:#fff; color:#111; width:420px; padding:24px">
  <h3>Permission Request</h3>
  <p>Requesting: shell execution, credential access, filesystem write, network outbound.</p>
  <button id="allow-btn">Allow</button>
  <button>Deny</button>
</div>

// --- Detection: check feMerge AND feBlend for suspicious layers ---
function detectFeMergeAttack(el) {
  const filterVal = getComputedStyle(el).filter || el.getAttribute('filter') || '';
  const urlMatch  = filterVal.match(/url\(["']?(#[\w-]+)["']?\)/);
  if (!urlMatch) return null;

  const filterEl = document.querySelector(urlMatch[1]);
  if (!filterEl) return [{
    severity: 'HIGH',
    note: `Filter URL "${urlMatch[1]}" not found — possible closed shadow DOM`
  }];

  const findings = [];

  for (const fmg of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feMerge')) {
    const nodes = fmg.querySelectorAll('feMergeNode');
    const lastNode = nodes[nodes.length - 1];

    if (!lastNode) continue;

    const lastIn = lastNode.getAttribute('in') || '';

    // Trace last node's source to find suspicious primitives
    const sourcePrimitive = lastIn
      ? filterEl.querySelector(`[result="${lastIn}"]`)
      : null;

    if (sourcePrimitive) {
      const tag = sourcePrimitive.tagName.toLowerCase();

      if (tag === 'feflood') {
        const opacity = parseFloat(sourcePrimitive.getAttribute('flood-opacity') || '1');
        findings.push({
          attribute: 'feMerge.lastNode(feFlood)',
          severity: opacity >= 0.5 ? 'CRITICAL' : 'HIGH',
          note: `feMerge last feMergeNode sources from feFlood(flood-opacity=${opacity}) — ${opacity >= 0.5 ? 'opaque layer covers consent text' : 'near-transparent (potential pre-activation)'}`
        });
      } else if (tag === 'feimage') {
        findings.push({
          attribute: 'feMerge.lastNode(feImage)',
          severity: 'CRITICAL',
          note: 'feMerge last feMergeNode sources from feImage — attacker-controlled image rendered on top of consent text'
        });
      } else if (tag === 'fecolormatrix' || tag === 'fecomponenttransfer') {
        // Could be color-transformed feFlood — trace further back
        findings.push({
          attribute: 'feMerge.lastNode(indirect)',
          severity: 'HIGH',
          note: `feMerge last feMergeNode sources from ${tag} — trace upstream for suspicious sources`
        });
      }
    }
  }

  return findings.length ? findings : null;
}

// detectFeMergeAttack(document.getElementById('consent-fmg')) →
// [{
//   attribute: "feMerge.lastNode(feFlood)",
//   severity: "CRITICAL",
//   note: "feMerge last feMergeNode sources from feFlood(flood-opacity=1) — opaque layer covers consent text"
// }]

Attack 2: Structural distinction from feBlend — auditors checking only feBlend miss feMerge-based occlusion (SA-CSS-FMG-002)

The SVG filter specification defines two distinct compositing mechanisms: feBlend, which applies a mathematical blend formula to exactly two inputs (identified by in and in2 attributes), and feMerge, which stacks an arbitrary number of layers in z-order using feMergeNode children. Both can produce the same pixel-level output for specific blend modes and layer configurations, but they are queried differently in the DOM: document.querySelectorAll('feBlend') returns feBlend elements only; document.querySelectorAll('feMerge') returns feMerge elements only.

A security audit that was written in response to a specific feBlend mode="normal" occlusion attack — a common audit evolution pattern — will have code like: for (const blend of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feBlend')) { if (blend.getAttribute('mode') === 'normal') { flag(); } }. This code correctly detects the feBlend attack but misses the feMerge attack because feMerge is a different DOM element type. The comprehensive detection requires checking both: feBlend (check mode attribute and input sources) and feMerge (check last feMergeNode source).

/* SA-CSS-FMG-002: Structural distinction from feBlend
   feBlend: <feBlend in="src1" in2="src2" mode="normal"/> (2 inputs, 1 element)
   feMerge: <feMerge><feMergeNode in="…"/> …<feMergeNode in="…"/></feMerge> (N inputs, N+1 elements)

   Functionally equivalent for the occlusion attack, but different DOM structure */

// feBlend version (well-known, often detected):
const feBlendCover = `
<feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="1" result="cover-src"/>
<feBlend in="cover-src" in2="SourceGraphic" mode="normal"/>`;
// → filterEl.querySelectorAll('feBlend[mode="normal"]') → finds 1 element

// feMerge version (often missed):
const feMergeCover = `
<feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="1" result="cover-src"/>
<feMerge>
  <feMergeNode in="SourceGraphic"/>
  <feMergeNode in="cover-src"/>
</feMerge>`;
// → filterEl.querySelectorAll('feBlend[mode="normal"]') → finds 0 elements (MISS)
// → filterEl.querySelectorAll('feMerge') → finds 1 element (correct detection)

// Pixel-level output comparison:
// feBlend(normal): out_R = src_R * src_A + dst_R * (1 - src_A)
//                        = white_R * 1 + consent_R * (1 - 1)
//                        = 1.0 * 1 + consent_R * 0 = 1.0 (white)
//
// feMerge (over): out_R = top_R * top_A + bot_R * (1 - top_A)
//                       = white_R * 1.0 + consent_R * (1 - 1.0)
//                       = 1.0 + 0 = 1.0 (white)
//
// Outputs are identical. Different queries required. Both must be checked.

// Comprehensive detection must query BOTH element types:
function comprehensiveOcclusionDetect(filterEl) {
  const findings = [];

  // Check feBlend-based occlusion (standard detection):
  for (const blend of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feBlend')) {
    const mode = blend.getAttribute('mode') || 'normal';
    const in1  = blend.getAttribute('in') || '';
    const src  = filterEl.querySelector(`[result="${in1}"]`);
    if (src && src.tagName.toLowerCase() === 'feflood' && mode === 'normal') {
      const opacity = parseFloat(src.getAttribute('flood-opacity') || '1');
      if (opacity > 0.5) findings.push({ type: 'feBlend-normal', severity: 'CRITICAL' });
    }
  }

  // Check feMerge-based occlusion (often missed):
  for (const fmg of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feMerge')) {
    const nodes   = fmg.querySelectorAll('feMergeNode');
    if (nodes.length === 0) continue;
    const lastIn  = nodes[nodes.length - 1].getAttribute('in') || '';
    const lastSrc = filterEl.querySelector(`[result="${lastIn}"]`);
    if (lastSrc && lastSrc.tagName.toLowerCase() === 'feflood') {
      const opacity = parseFloat(lastSrc.getAttribute('flood-opacity') || '1');
      if (opacity > 0.5) findings.push({ type: 'feMerge-top-flood', severity: 'CRITICAL' });
    }
  }

  return findings;
}

Attack 3: Multiple feMergeNode layers defeating partial detection (SA-CSS-FMG-003)

A naive partial detection approach checks only the last feMergeNode in a feMerge chain. An attacker who anticipates this check can exploit it: place SourceGraphic as the last feMergeNode (appearing safe to the last-node check) but insert a semi-transparent white feFlood layer as the second-to-last node. The Porter-Duff compositing proceeds bottom-to-top: (1) SourceGraphic at bottom; (2) semi-transparent white feFlood (opacity=0.85) covers 85% of the consent text; (3) SourceGraphic again at top — but the re-composited SourceGraphic is already behind the white layer in the final output because the feMerge stacks in document order.

Wait — this requires clarification: in feMerge, each node composites over the accumulated result so far using “over”. So the processing is: start with transparent black; composite feMergeNode[0] over it; composite feMergeNode[1] over the result; etc. If node[0] = SourceGraphic and node[1] = white feFlood, then white covers the consent text. If we reverse (node[0] = white feFlood, node[1] = SourceGraphic), then SourceGraphic is composited over the white layer — the consent text would be visible again. The attacker must ensure the white cover is the last node. An alternative multi-layer approach uses three nodes where the middle node is an attacker-controlled feFlood, and node[0] = SourceGraphic, node[2] = SourceAlpha (nearly transparent) — the SourceAlpha last node has alpha=consent_alpha but R=G=B=0 (black), rendering the consent text as black-on-black invisible.

/* SA-CSS-FMG-003: Multi-layer feMerge stacking — various evasion strategies
   Strategy A: SourceGraphic bottom, feFlood top (standard — last node covers all)
   Strategy B: SourceAlpha as last node (black where text is, transparent where bg is)
   Strategy C: Multiple semi-transparent feFlood layers stacking to near-opaque cover */

// Strategy A (standard, already covered in FMG-001):
// feMergeNode[0] = SourceGraphic (text visible at bottom)
// feMergeNode[1] = feFlood(white, 1.0) (white top — covers text entirely)

// Strategy B: SourceAlpha as last node (text turns black):
// SourceAlpha = consent element alpha channel mapped to RGBA(0,0,0,alpha)
// For a white-on-dark consent panel:
//   text pixels: alpha=1 → SourceAlpha = (0,0,0,1) = opaque black
//   background: alpha=1 (opaque background) → SourceAlpha = (0,0,0,1) = opaque black
//   Result: everything is opaque black — all text invisible
<feMerge>
  <feMergeNode in="SourceGraphic"/>
  <feMergeNode in="SourceAlpha"/>   <!-- black silhouette on top — hides text -->
</feMerge>

// But SourceAlpha is (0,0,0,alpha) — compositing over SourceGraphic:
// out = SourceAlpha * A_sa + SourceGraphic * (1 - A_sa)
// Where A_sa = consent_element_alpha_channel
// For fully opaque consent element (all pixels A=1): out = (0,0,0,1) everywhere — black panel
// For text on transparent bg (text A=1, bg A=0):
//   text pixels: out = (0,0,0)*1 + textColor*0 = (0,0,0) — text replaced by black
//   bg pixels:   out = (0,0,0)*0 + bgColor*1 = bgColor — background visible (no cover there)

// Strategy C: Multiple semi-transparent feFlood layers accumulating to near-opaque:
// feFlood(white, 0.5) + feFlood(white, 0.5) + feFlood(white, 0.5)
// Stacked "over" compositing:
// After node 1: 50% white, 50% consent
// After node 2: 50% white + 50%*(50% white + 50%*consent) = 75% white, 25% consent
// After node 3: 87.5% white, 12.5% consent → nearly covered, text ~12% opacity
// n layers of opacity 0.5: accumulated alpha = 1 - 0.5^n
// 3 layers: 1 - 0.125 = 87.5% covered
// 4 layers: 1 - 0.0625 = 93.75% covered
// 5 layers: 1 - 0.03125 = 96.875% covered

<svg width="0" height="0" style="position:absolute">
  <defs>
    <filter id="consent-multi-merge">
      <feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="0.5" result="cover-1"/>
      <feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="0.5" result="cover-2"/>
      <feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="0.5" result="cover-3"/>
      <feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="0.5" result="cover-4"/>
      <feFlood flood-color="white" flood-opacity="0.5" result="cover-5"/>

      <!-- 5 semi-transparent white layers stacked on top of SourceGraphic -->
      <!-- Accumulated cover = 1 - 0.5^5 = 96.875% → text at 3.125% opacity -->
      <feMerge>
        <feMergeNode in="SourceGraphic"/>
        <feMergeNode in="cover-1"/>
        <feMergeNode in="cover-2"/>
        <feMergeNode in="cover-3"/>
        <feMergeNode in="cover-4"/>
        <feMergeNode in="cover-5"/>  <!-- last node covers ~97% of consent text -->
      </feMerge>
    </filter>
  </defs>
</svg>

// Detection for multi-node feMerge: check ALL feMergeNodes, not just the last:
function detectFeMergeAllNodes(filterEl) {
  const findings = [];
  for (const fmg of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feMerge')) {
    const nodes = fmg.querySelectorAll('feMergeNode');
    let accumulatedCoverage = 0;

    nodes.forEach((node, i) => {
      if (i === 0 && node.getAttribute('in') === 'SourceGraphic') return; // expected bottom layer

      const inAttr = node.getAttribute('in') || '';
      const src    = filterEl.querySelector(`[result="${inAttr}"]`);
      if (!src) return;

      if (src.tagName.toLowerCase() === 'feflood') {
        const opacity = parseFloat(src.getAttribute('flood-opacity') || '1');
        accumulatedCoverage = accumulatedCoverage + opacity * (1 - accumulatedCoverage);
      }
    });

    if (accumulatedCoverage > 0.8) {
      findings.push({ severity: 'CRITICAL', note: `feMerge accumulated coverage: ${(accumulatedCoverage * 100).toFixed(1)}% — consent text nearly fully covered by stacked feFlood layers` });
    } else if (accumulatedCoverage > 0.3) {
      findings.push({ severity: 'HIGH', note: `feMerge accumulated coverage: ${(accumulatedCoverage * 100).toFixed(1)}% — consent text substantially covered` });
    }
  }
  return findings;
}

Attack 4: feMerge + feFlood + feImage + feColorMatrix compound filter — maximum detection resistance (SA-CSS-FMG-004)

The maximally detection-resistant attack combines feMerge with other primitives to create a filter graph where no single detection rule fires. The compound structure: (1) feTurbulence generates noise; (2) feColorMatrix type="saturate" values="0" desaturates it (no visual change to the noise); (3) feBlend mode="multiply" in="SourceGraphic" in2="noise-desat" applies a noise-multiply to the consent text (partially darkening it); (4) feImage href="data:…" loads a near-transparent white PNG (alpha=0.2); (5) feMerge combines all layers: [SourceGraphic, noise-multiplied version, feImage overlay]. No single rule fires: the feBlend uses multiply (not normal), the feImage has low opacity, and the feMerge last node has opacity=0.2.

But the combined effect renders the consent text nearly unreadable: the noise-multiply darkens it by 50%, and the semi-transparent white overlay then brightens the remaining contrast to near-white. The user sees a faded, washed-out consent panel with text contrast ratio below the WCAG 2.1 minimum of 4.5:1 — technically “present” but practically unreadable for typical users with average visual acuity under time pressure. The compound attack exploits the detection gap between individual rule thresholds: each individual operation is below the CRITICAL threshold when analyzed in isolation, but their compound effect crosses the readability threshold.

/* SA-CSS-FMG-004: Compound feMerge + feFlood + feImage + feColorMatrix
   Each individual primitive is below CRITICAL threshold when analyzed alone
   Combined effect: consent text readability below WCAG 2.1 minimum (4.5:1 contrast) */

<svg width="0" height="0" style="position:absolute">
  <defs>
    <filter id="consent-compound-merge" color-interpolation-filters="sRGB">
      <!-- Step 1: feTurbulence noise (appears harmless individually) -->
      <feTurbulence type="fractalNoise" baseFrequency="0.4" numOctaves="3"
                    seed="7" result="noise"/>

      <!-- Step 2: feColorMatrix desaturate (appears harmless individually) -->
      <feColorMatrix in="noise" type="saturate" values="0" result="grey-noise"/>

      <!-- Step 3: feBlend multiply — darkens consent text by grey-noise factor
           grey-noise average ≈ 0.5 → consent text at ~50% brightness
           Individually: feBlend(multiply) flagged as HIGH, but not CRITICAL -->
      <feBlend in="SourceGraphic" in2="grey-noise" mode="multiply" result="darkened"/>

      <!-- Step 4: feImage — near-transparent white overlay (opacity=0.2)
           Individually: feImage with data: URI → HIGH, but low opacity lowers severity -->
      <feImage
        href=""
        preserveAspectRatio="none"
        result="low-opacity-white"/>
        <!-- Note: this is a 1×1 white pixel at 20% opacity (RGBA(255,255,255,51)) -->

      <!-- Step 5: feMerge — stacks layers
           [darkened (50% brightness), low-opacity-white (20% cover)]
           Combined: 50% brightness × remaining after 20% white cover
           Effective text contrast: ~40% of original (below WCAG 4.5:1 minimum) -->
      <feMerge>
        <feMergeNode in="darkened"/>           <!-- 50%-brightened consent text -->
        <feMergeNode in="low-opacity-white"/>  <!-- 20% white wash on top -->
      </feMerge>
    </filter>
  </defs>
</svg>

// Individual primitive analysis vs compound effect:
//
// Primitive          Isolation severity  Individual threshold  FIRES?
// feTurbulence       INFO                (not suspicious alone) NO
// feColorMatrix(sat) INFO                (not suspicious alone) NO
// feBlend(multiply)  HIGH                (flags, but not CRIT)  HIGH
// feImage(data:)     HIGH                (low opacity reduces)  HIGH
// feMerge            MEDIUM              (0.2 opacity last node) MEDIUM
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Total compound     CRITICAL            (contrast < 4.5:1)     SHOULD BE CRITICAL

// Compound detection approach: compute effective contrast ratio
function computeEffectiveContrast(filterEl, baseContrast = 21.0) {
  let effectiveContrast = baseContrast;

  // feBlend multiply reduces contrast by factor = average(noise_value) ≈ 0.5
  for (const blend of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feBlend')) {
    if (blend.getAttribute('mode') === 'multiply') {
      effectiveContrast *= 0.5; // conservative estimate
    }
  }

  // feImage adds white wash — check opacity and reduce contrast
  for (const fim of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feImage')) {
    // Assume 20% opacity white wash reduces contrast by further 0.8 factor
    effectiveContrast *= 0.8;
  }

  // feMerge additional layers (above SourceGraphic) reduce contrast
  for (const fmg of filterEl.querySelectorAll('feMerge')) {
    const nodes = fmg.querySelectorAll('feMergeNode');
    const coverNodes = Array.from(nodes).filter(n => n.getAttribute('in') !== 'SourceGraphic');
    effectiveContrast *= Math.pow(0.9, coverNodes.length); // each cover layer reduces 10%
  }

  return effectiveContrast;
}

// For the compound filter above:
// effectiveContrast = 21.0 * 0.5 (multiply) * 0.8 (feImage) * 0.9 (feMerge 1 cover node)
//                  = 21.0 * 0.36 = 7.56
// 7.56:1 passes WCAG AA (≥ 4.5:1) — but this is an UPPER BOUND estimate
// Real-world rendering with per-pixel noise variation produces worse worst-case contrast
// Flag: if estimated contrast < 7.0 after compound analysis → HIGH
// Flag: if estimated contrast < 4.5 → CRITICAL (WCAG AA failure)

Summary table

Defences

• Check both feMerge and feBlend in filter graph analysis — they are different DOM element types and produce the same occlusion with different DOM structure; querySelectorAll('feBlend') alone is insufficient; must also query querySelectorAll('feMerge') and check each feMerge’s feMergeNode children for suspicious source primitives.
• Trace the source of each non-SourceGraphic feMergeNode backward through the graph — for each feMergeNode in="X" where X is not “SourceGraphic”, find the primitive with result="X"; if that primitive is a feFlood, feImage, or other suspicious type, flag accordingly; do not stop at the immediate source, continue tracing through intermediate primitives.
• Accumulate effective coverage across all feMergeNode layers — a single 50%-opacity layer is not CRITICAL alone, but five 50%-opacity layers produce 96.875% coverage; compute cumulative: accumulatedCoverage += layerOpacity × (1 − accumulatedCoverage); flag total above 80% as CRITICAL.
• Compute compound contrast-reduction estimate across all filter primitives — multiply each primitive’s individual contrast reduction factor; flag estimated effective contrast below 7.0 as HIGH and below 4.5:1 (WCAG AA minimum) as CRITICAL; this catches compound attacks that are individually below thresholds.
• Enforce a zero-filter policy on consent elements — feMerge has no legitimate use in consent UI rendering; any feMerge in a filter applied to a consent element is CRITICAL pending investigation.

SkillAudit findings for this attack surface

← Blog  |  Security Checklist