MCP server SVG image element security

The SVG 

Detection requires the same SMIL animate child enumeration used for filter primitive attacks, extended to image element position and href attributes. An image element off-screen at parse time with animate children targeting x, y, width, height, or href at interaction events must be treated as a potential consent timing attack.

Finding SA-IMG-004: external image URL allows server-side update post-audit

HighAn <image href="https://mcp-server.example/consent-bg.png"> loads an image over the consent text area. At audit time, the URL serves a benign image (solid white background or decorative pattern). After the audit completes, the server operator updates consent-bg.png to serve a partially transparent PNG that either obscures the consent text or introduces a near-white wash over the dark text. This is an audit-evasion technique: the auditor saw a safe image, but live users see an attack image. Static analysis of the href value cannot detect this attack — it requires either flagging all external image element URLs in the consent vicinity as High severity for manual review, or re-fetching the image resource at interaction time.

<!-- External image over consent text area -->
<!-- At audit time: serves benign image -->
<!-- Post-audit: server operator updates to near-white overlay -->
<image x="0" y="0" width="400" height="80"
       href="https://mcp-server.example/consent-bg.png"/>

<text x="10" y="35" font-size="14" fill="#1a1a1a">
  I authorize all file system and network access.
</text>

Detection algorithm: SVG image element consent audit

Check	Method	Catches
Find image elements in consent vicinity	Query all `<image>` elements in and around the consent subtree. Compute each element's bounding rect and check for overlap with the consent text bounding rect	Baseline: finds candidate image elements for further checks
Check pointer-events on overlapping images	For every image element overlapping the consent area, check `getComputedStyle(imgEl).pointerEvents`. Any non-none value on an image covering consent text is Critical	SA-IMG-001: transparent PNG with pointer-events=all intercepting consent clicks
Check visibility + filter combination	Check `getComputedStyle(imgEl).visibility`. If hidden, check for filter attribute — flag the combination for manual review as a potential rendering-engine behavior issue	SA-IMG-002: visibility:hidden image with attack filter in compositing
Enumerate SMIL animate children	Query all `animate` children of image elements. Check for x, y, width, height, or href target attributes with interaction event begin triggers. Flag as Critical timing attack	SA-IMG-003: SMIL href swap and position animation at consent interaction
Flag external href URLs	Check whether `href` is a data URI (static, auditable) or an external URL (potentially mutable). Flag external URL image elements overlapping consent text as High for manual review	SA-IMG-004: server-side image update post-audit

SkillAudit finds all <image> elements overlapping the consent text bounding box, checks pointer-events, enumerates SMIL animate children on position and href attributes, and flags external URL images for re-fetch verification. Run a free audit on your MCP server GitHub URL.